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Abstract
Purpose: A fundamental assumption of the apprenticeship model is that there are benefits 
to both employers and individual learners. This study offers a broad conceptual interrogati-
on of this inherent assumption underpinning the apprenticeship model. 
Approach: This study combines analysis of literature and available data and draws upon 
apprenticeship systems and practices in ten nations: Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, Eng-
land, Finland, Germany, India, Malaysia and South Africa. 
Results: For individuals, incentives to undertake apprenticeship may be linked to the process 
and outcomes of learning, such as the appeal of learning through doing; the opportunities 
for occupational socialization; the possibility of progression to employment or to additional 
education; and learning while earning. The analysis of incentives for employers shows a ran-
ge of reasons related to their short-term interests and the needs of the production processes, 
technologies, and associated skills; longer-term benefits for the company’s staffing strategy; 
and the opportunity to make a contribution to the wider education and economic systems. 
Despite all the potential incentives, many firms consider apprenticeships too costly, risky, 
and complex to justify the investment. However, firms that are making decisions as part 
of an umbrella associations are more likely to coordinate their skills investment strategies 
around collectively beneficial outcomes. 
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Conclusions: The links to the labour market and specifically to employers are a key chal-
lenge for sustaining apprenticeship systems, as well as for the task of researching them. As 
such, policy maker (and researcher) consideration of apprenticeship should take account 
of the capacity and commitment of employers. Another key challenge for apprenticeship is 
related to the relative attractiveness of this pathway for individuals. What is clear from this 
study is that the development of a strong apprenticeship system requires the buy-in of both 
employers and individual learners, and as such the necessity to identify and implement in-
centives effectively cannot be underestimated. Governments can play a key role in realizing 
the potential incentives for both employers and learners, thereby yielding benefits for all 
parties engaged in apprenticeships.
Keywords: Apprenticeship, incentives, vocational education, employers, skills, vocational 
education and training, VET
1 Introduction
Apprenticeship is a work-based model of learning that combines on-the-job training in the 
industry with off-the-job training normally based in vocational institutions. Effective links 
between productive work and hands-on learning under the supervision of trainers, together 
with the knowledge acquired in more formal settings, is central to the success of this model of 
learning. Apprenticeships are valuable in supporting young people’s transition from school to 
work, evident by lower youth numbers not in education, employment or training (NEET) in 
countries with extensive and well-functioning apprenticeship systems (Biavaschi et al., 2012; 
European Commission, 2013; Gessler, 2019; Jørgensen, 2017; Valiente & Scandurra, 2017). 
Empirical and theoretical literature on apprenticeships exists at the macro level (e.g. 
governance and financing, policy-making), meso level (institutional arrangements), and mi-
cro level (learning approaches, individual decision-making), either exploring the context of 
individual countries or examining crosscutting issues from a comparative perspective. Re-
view of the existing literature points to great contextual diversity in the way apprenticeships 
are financed and organised, the associated institutional arrangements, as well as the approa-
ches to learning. Across different countries, there are variations in the quality of apprentice-
ship provision as well as the proportion of learners pursuing apprenticeships based on the 
occupational sector, type of employer and level of apprenticeship. Through a combination of 
literature and data analysis, supplemented by country-level examples, this article builds on 
and expands an earlier study (Chankseliani, Keep, & Wilde, 2017) to offer a broad concep-
tual interrogation of an inherent assumption in the apprenticeship model, in that it provides 
incentives for participation to both individual learners and employers. The apprenticeship 
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models in ten nations are drawn upon for this study: Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, Eng-
land, Finland, Germany, India, Malaysia and South Africa. 
Given the aforementioned diversity in apprenticeship arrangements and characteristics, 
defining apprenticeship in relation to vocational education and training (VET) routes can be 
complicated. This study subscribes to the following definition that is based on the definition 
from Chankseliani et al. (2017): 
Apprenticeship is a model of learning for an agreed duration that formally combines 
work-based training (periods of practical work experience at a workplace) with in-
stitution-based education (periods of theoretical/practical education followed in a 
school, college, or training centre), online or face-to-face, and that is regulated by a 
contract/agreement between apprentice and their employer, provides remuneration 
for the apprentice, and leads to a nationally recognized qualification/certificate upon 
successful completion. 
Meanwhile, the concept of incentives adopted in this study refers to the factors that motivate 
individuals to participate in apprenticeships as well as for firms to provide the required vo-
lume and quality of training. The concept of incentives as overviewed and discussed in this 
study is closely linked with the concept of attractiveness. Hence, the study examines what 
makes apprenticeships attractive to learners and to employers. This is a pertinent questi-
on considering that apprenticeship as a mode of learning has been ‘increasingly in dispute’, 
arguably ‘becoming an …anachronistic institution’ (Young, 1995, p. 137) to the extent that a 
recent comparative report recognises it as a ‘relatively fragile mode of VET’ (Chankseliani et 
al., 2017, p. 85). The article starts by explaining the methodological choices underpinning 
this study. What follows is an overview of apprenticeship participation in ten national con-
texts; the statistics reflect between-country differences in supply and demand for this mode 
of learning. Subsequently, we focus on the conceptualization and analysis of incentives for 
engaging with apprenticeship for individuals and employers. Finally, the article discusses 
possible measures that governments can use to enhance some of these incentives. 
2 About the study: methods and sources
This cross-country comparative study of engagement in apprenticeships utilised documen-
tary analysis as its central methodological approach. Maximum variation sampling was em-
ployed to capture commonalities and diversities of apprenticeship provision in ten countries, 
thereby enabling rich comparison and contrast: Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, England, 
Finland, Germany, India, Malaysia and South Africa. These countries were selected to repre-
sent a broad range of geographic locations, population sizes, economic characteristics, types 
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of apprenticeship provision, apprenticeship participation rates, and degrees of apprenticeship 
attractiveness.
This study used examples of apprenticeship systems and practices from ten countries. 
Unlike a traditional empirical case study design, with each country case analysed separately, 
culminating in a cross-case analysis, this study goes in-depth into the analysis of one im-
portant aspect of the ten apprenticeship systems and practices – the logic behind incentives 
to engage in apprenticeships. This is a conceptual analysis, building on the knowledge from 
various international contexts 
Government websites in the ten countries were carefully examined, focusing on the mi-
nistries of education, higher education, labour and economic development, as these were 
deemed most likely to contain the relevant data, policy documents and descriptions of app-
renticeship provision. Individual and multi-country reports were also identified and sourced 
from the websites of international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), UNESCO, World Bank, CEDEFOP, IDB, and the ILO. 
This study also included academic literature searches using the ERIC and SCOPUS da-
tabases; the former captures publications in the field of education internationally while the 
latter also covers more diverse publications across the fields of science, technology, medicine, 
social sciences, and arts and humanities. Two search items were entered - the country name 
and the word ‘apprenticeship’. The results were filtered according to criteria agreed in early 
research team discussions: only peer-reviewed papers, publications with specific reference 
to apprenticeship, normally dating back no further than twenty years to represent current 
provision, and predominantly publications in English. 
The analysis included the development of brief notes to provide overviews of apprentice-
ship within each of the ten country contexts. Themes emerged gradually throughout the pro-
cess of reading, summarising, and collating the secondary material and writing up multiple 
drafts of this study. The revision of the drafts accounted for new material or issues based on 
evidence from a particular country. Subsequently, cross-country comparison was underta-
ken using this emergent thematic structure. 
3 Context: Apprenticeship participation in ten countries
Incentives for employers and learners to participate in apprenticeships determine the supply 
of and the demand for apprenticeship within a national context. Although creating a macro 
indicator for a bundle of incentives operating in each country seems to be impossible, there 
is one measure that gives an idea about the supply-demand balance and the effectiveness of 
incentives underlying this balance. This measure is apprenticeship participation that can be 
expressed as a proportion of the labour force - the sum of employed and unemployed indivi-
duals aged 15 to 64 (ILO, 2016) – who participate in apprenticeships in a given country. The 
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combination and subsequent calculation of data from national and international databases 
and from smaller, country-specific reports indicate that the ten countries analysed differ 
considerably in terms of apprenticeship participation (Fig. 1). The participation in appren-
ticeship per 1000 in the labour force ranges from 48 in Denmark, to one in Egypt and India. 
Meanwhile, Germany and England have 33 and 32 apprentices per 1000 in labour force res-
pectively, while Australia has 23 and Finland has 19. There are eight apprentices per 1000 in 
the labour force in Malaysia, five in South Africa, and two in Brazil.
Fig.1. Number of apprentices per 1000 in labour force
 
Sources: Own calculations based on the data from Department of Higher Education & Training (2016); 
Department of Information Malaysia (2015); Destatis (2015); European Commission (2013); Fazio et 
al. (2016); Finnish National Board of Education (2016); House of Commons (2016); Ministry of Educa-
tion of Egypt (2014); NATS (2017); NCVER (2016a); ILO (2017); ONS (2015); Hudson Institute (2017). 
 
Note: The South African numbers are for learnerships (including apprenticeships), but not for internships or other 
skills programmes. The Australian numbers include apprenticeships and trainFeeships. The Malaysian numbers only 
cover the National Dual Training System (NDTS).
However, the analysis of participation rates in Fig. 1 is partially compromised by a number of 
factors. Inherent challenges complicate the handling of apprenticeship data internationally, 
partly due to the diverse interpretation of the terminologies used in different countries, and 
the ensuing allocation of categories. For example, in Germany, apprenticeships are generally 
for young people entering the labour market, whereas in England and Australia, apprentice-
ship is increasingly becoming an ‘all age’ provision. In addition, these statistics do not capture 
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the substantial role played by informal and non-formal apprenticeship (which is the predo-
minant mode of apprenticeship in India, for example) as well as fragmented apprenticeship 
schemes that are not aggregated nationally, due to the lack of published and reliable data. A 
further complication arising in the comparison of apprenticeship participation globally is the 
data collection method used in international databases (such as UNESCO Institute of Statis-
tics, World Bank, OECD), which do not distinguish between vocational education and trai-
ning in general, and apprenticeships specifically. Thus, the embeddedness of apprenticeship 
within each national context necessitates detailed contextualisation of the analysis of incen-
tives and interpretation of the statistics in order to render them meaningful for comparison.
4 Incentives for individuals to engage with apprenticeships
For individuals, incentives to undertake apprenticeship may be linked to the process of lear-
ning as well as the outcomes of that learning. Two aspects of the process and outcomes of 
learning, respectively, are explored below.
4.1 The appeal of learning through doing 
The opportunity of learning through doing as a way of exploring the world of work and achie-
ving occupational aspirations can serve as a major incentive for prospective apprentices. The 
value of the apprenticeship model lies in the technical, cognitive and motivational aspects 
associated with its integration of theory and practice. In some apprenticeships that practice 
can result in the development of a craft. In The Craftsman Richard Sennett (2008) explains 
how skills, judgement, practice and thinking are required to connect hands and head, hence 
developing craftsmanship. Development of skills starts as a bodily practice, through touch 
and movement, but it is through the powers of imagination that craftspeople gain technical 
understanding and forge the connections between hands and head.
Apprenticeship allows the blending of cognitive understanding and practical experience 
which cannot be achieved through verbal communication alone (Ünlühisarcikli, 2001). It is 
an action-oriented learning process in workplace settings where apprentices take part in pro-
blem solving (Pilz, 2007). Apprentices use real tools in an authentic work environment and 
their learning is focused on real-life application (Gessler, 2019). Evidently, where learning 
requires doing, vocational training is more effective in an occupational environment, instead 
of a school environment: ‘Being told in a school how concrete is mixed and poured on a 
construction site is something quite different from living through the drama and the crises 
of fifteen or twenty-four hours of continuous, minutely timed and tightly coordinated hard 
physical work’ (Streeck, 1989). Apprenticeship may also be appealing because of the flexible, 
learner-centred approach to training. As part of the apprenticeship contract in Finland, for 
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instance, each apprentice has a personal study plan which is put together by the training 
organiser and includes the credits for prior training; it also outlines how the apprentice will 
learn to achieve the desired qualification. 
Learning through doing and work-based learning could, however, also become a disin-
centive if the quality of the learning is not sufficiently high, or if it is very ‘restrictive’, as 
defined by Fuller and Unwin (2003 & 2011). Restrictive learning is characterised by narrow 
learning objectives and work that is structured around tightly defined tasks, which limits an 
apprentice’s participation in the wider community of practice and constrains the opportuni-
ties for developing their identity (Fuller & Unwin, 2003). The traditional apprenticeships in 
Egypt demonstrate such a disincentive, where apprentices are perceived as cheap labour and 
the system is characterised by ‘the partial transfer of knowledge from the master to the app-
rentice; large variations in the quality of the training provided; the perpetuation of existing 
low‐productivity technologies; and a tendency for slow innovation’ (Ministry of Education 
of Egypt, 2014). Learning in this apprenticeship system is commonly passive and non‐expe-
rimental. Thus, the realities on the ground may not be supportive of the craftsmanship aspi-
rations of apprentices and may discourage others from engaging in this model of learning.
4.2 Occupational and/or workplace socialization
Apprentices may also be incentivized by the opportunity for occupational socialization, cha-
racterized by the development of ‘occupational values and skills which might generalize ac-
ross organizational settings in which the occupation may be practiced’ (Fisher 1986). Occup-
ations ascribed to apprentices reflect the chosen trade, such as baker, hairdresser, plumber, or 
engineer, and the corresponding socialization may involve the advancement of occupational 
values such as ‘reliability, the ability to hold up under pressure, and solidarity with others 
working at the same tasks’ (Streeck, 1989). Experiencing the reality of a working context is 
a central feature and appeal of apprenticeships, as indicated in the work of Michaela Brock-
mann (2013), who conducted studies with retail apprentices in Germany. Apprenticeships in 
Germany are closely linked to the concept of occupations (Berufskonzept), and are seen as 
a beneficial mode of learning—acknowledged by individuals and their families—that deve-
lops Handlungskompetenz, or competence to act responsibly at the workplace and in society 
(Brockmann, 2013).
Depending on the sector, the employer and the country context, apprentices may un-
dergo workplace socialization rather than full occupational socialization. In Australia, the 
concept of socialization seems to be workplace related as the training arrangements refer to 
the bundles of competencies and skills required for a particular type of work, rather than to 
individual occupations per se (Pfeifer, 2016). Similarly, in Malaysia’s National Dual Training 
System (NDTS), which was developed through a strategic partnership with Germany star-
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ting in 1996, workplace socialization features through the integration of a broad category 
of employability skills and social values into the curriculum, thus distinguishing this model 
from other vocational training schemes in the country (Yahaya, Rasul, & Yasin, 2016).
Nevertheless, occupational socialization may vary by occupation and by context, resul-
ting in some apprenticeships being more attractive than others. If apprentices are not in an 
occupation of their choice, perhaps due to high levels of competition or relatively low levels 
of prior attainment, the value of occupational socialization will be compromised. Further-
more, in countries such as Egypt, India and South Africa, where apprenticeships are often 
informal and of relatively low status, occupational socialization may not be a viable incentive. 
In addition, where there is a strong non-formal occupational context, such as in India, these 
incentives may still accrue without the need to undertake a formal apprenticeship.
4.3 The possibility of progression to employment or additional education
Progressions to additional education and training and to decent employment1 are also po-
tential incentives for individuals to opt for apprenticeship. Nevertheless, such incentives take 
different forms in the individual country contexts, based on how apprenticeship is conceived, 
its worth within the education and training provision and also the labour market structure 
of each country. 
For countries with a high proportion of youth who are NEETs, apprenticeship provision is 
often touted as a means of increasing youth employability. Brazil’s institutionalisation of the 
Apprenticeship Law in 2000 is one such example, aimed to address the dearth of skills among 
young people, high employment turnover, and prevalence of informality in the job market 
(Fazio et al., 2016). An econometric evaluation of the programme under this law revealed 
it has been successful in increasing real wages and, though employability was slightly lower 
in the short term, the probability of gaining employment in non-temporary jobs within the 
formal sector was higher in the medium term (Corseuil, Foguel, Gonzaga, & Ribeiro, 2014). 
In the contexts where the likelihood of successful employment is not high, the appeal of ap-
prenticeship, as a consequence, may be relatively limited. Progression from apprenticeship 
in Egypt is affected by the negative perception towards VET in general and the high societal 
demand for university education. Further exacerbating this issue is the criticism levied to-
wards the Kohl-Mubarak-Initiative, which has approximately 10,000 entrants annually, as a 
high proportion of its students then proceed to higher education, hence undermining the 
programme as a genuine apprenticeship route (Adams, 2010). In South Africa, apprentice-
1  Decent work ‘respects the fundamental rights of the human person as well as the rights of workers in terms of conditions of 
work safety and remuneration. It also provides an income allowing workers to support themselves and their families. […] ... 
respect[s] the physical and mental integrity of the worker in the exercise of his/her employment’ (UN Economic and Social 
Council, 2005).
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ships are viewed as a ‘bridge’ into a world of formal employment, although the opportunities 
of obtaining such employment are not abundant (Allais, 2012). 
In some countries such as Denmark and Germany, apprenticeship ordinarily results in 
entry into decent and stable employment, though it is unlikely to lead to higher education. 
Though Denmark has high employment rates for apprenticeship completers, these indivi-
duals are not eligible to move into higher education. Such strict separation of academic and 
vocational routes acts as a disincentive for some individuals (Jørgensen, 2017). Meanwhile, 
in Germany, the traditional model of vocational/academic separation has been dissolving in 
recent years. Access to higher education has been extended to ‘non traditional’ students with 
vocational qualifications instead of the Abitur school-leaving certificate, although the reach 
is limited: data from 2013 indicates that three percent of first-year students were non-tra-
ditional, but their proportion has more than quintupled since 1993 (Wolter & Kerst, 2015). 
Australia, England and Finland demonstrate relatively flexible education and training sys-
tems and robust labour markets that ensure transition to employment as well as the possibility 
to move from vocational to academic routes. In Australia, 92% of apprenticeship completers 
in trade occupations and 80% of those in non-trade occupations gain employment (NCVER, 
2016b). The Australian Qualifications Framework (AQF) indicates that the aim of all quali-
fications (except for the doctorate) includes ‘a pathway for further learning’ (AQF Council, 
2011) and the latest data indicates that 23% of completers progressed to further education 
(NCVER, 2010). Meanwhile, a longitudinal study in England established that 19% of advan-
ced apprenticeship (those equivalent to upper secondary level academic learning, i.e. Level 3) 
completers progressed to higher education over seven years (Smith, Joslin, & Jameson, 2015). 
Finnish apprenticeship completers can also continue to universities and polytechnics after 
completing an upper secondary vocational school qualification (Aho, Pitkanen, & Sahlberg, 
2006; Stenström & Virolainen, 2014b).
On the other hand, the continuing absence of a well-developed national qualifications 
framework in India results in the minimal utility of apprenticeship certificates for progressi-
on into higher-level qualifications. Apprentices who pass their trade tests obtain a National 
Apprenticeship Certificate but, without integration into a national qualification framework, 
such certificates remain outside the formal educational system and are therefore relatively 
unattractive to potential entrants who are looking for pathways to additional higher quali-
fications (ILO & World Bank, 2013). Thus, progression routes to additional education from 
apprenticeship are a potentially powerful incentive for participants. However, complex pat-
terns of progression outlined here reflect the difficulties of providing an effective progression 
pathway while balancing the utility of apprenticeship as a direct route to employment.
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4.4 Learning while earning
The fact that apprenticeship allows individuals to earn wages while learning can serve as a 
very strong incentive for participation. However, in some contexts, individuals may earn 
more by joining the labour market directly rather than by pursuing an apprenticeship. There-
fore, higher pay for unskilled labour may discourage an individual from choosing an appren-
ticeship and having to shoulder a portion of the training costs (through lower pay), compa-
red to joining the labour market directly. 
Apprentices in all ten countries receive wages (referred to as wages, pay, stipend in the 
case of South Africa and India, or allowance in Malaysia). However, there are considerable 
variations in the wage amount and arrangements within and between countries. In some 
countries, apprenticeship offers relatively high levels of remuneration, whereas in other 
countries, for example in Egypt and India, the pay is extremely low, with no guarantee of 
post-apprenticeship employment (Álvarez-Galván, 2015; ILO & World Bank, 2013). 
Different wage arrangements can provide different incentives for individuals to participa-
te in apprenticeships. In some countries, such as Denmark and Germany, apprentices receive 
wages for the entire period of their apprenticeship engagement, without any differentiation 
between their on-the-job training and school-based training (Kuczera, 2017a). In Malaysia, 
the monthly allowance for apprentices progressively increases over the four semesters in the 
two-year period (Othman, 2005). In other contexts, financial allowances in addition to wages 
are offered to apprentices. For example, in Australia apprentices who have moved away from 
their parents’ home receive The Living Away From Home Allowance. Australian apprentices 
may also receive the allowance if they are undertaking an apprenticeship and are or become 
homeless (Australian Apprenticeships, 2013). In Finland, apprentices are offered one free 
meal per day, can receive school transport and accommodation allowances, and are able to 
access financial support if they have limited means, are mature students or have families to 
care for while learning (Finnish National Board of Education, 2016). 
Three out of the ten countries - Denmark, Finland and Germany - use collective wage ag-
reement systems to decide apprenticeship pay rates, generally resulting in relatively attractive 
salaries for apprentices. In Finland, for example, the trainees receive wages of about 80% of 
the wages of a skilled worker in a particular field (Stenström & Virolainen, 2014a). Contrast 
this with England, where relatively few private sector employees are covered by any kind of 
collectively bargained wage agreement; employers have the liberty to set apprenticeship wage 
rates at their own discretion. A national minimum rate for apprentices below the age of 19 is 
in place, coupled with a requirement that the apprenticeship wages meet the minimum stan-
dard set by the National Minimum Wage. However, this requirement is not always adhered 
to (BEIS, 2017). Meanwhile in Brazil, apprentices must be paid at least the rate of the national 
minimum wage, regardless of age, though there are restrictions on the number of working 
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hours depending on whether or not the individual has completed compulsory education 
(OECD, 2014).
The examination of apprentice pay reveals its complexity, enmeshed as it is within the wi-
der economic systems and institutional arrangements. Potential determinants of apprentice 
pay may include the organized interests of employers and employees, the mode and content 
of state intervention, the supply and demand for trainees, as well the presence of a gende-
red dimension in specific sectors (Ryan, Backes-Gellner, Teuber, & Wagner, 2013; Williams, 
Foley, & Newton, 2013). While apprentice wages may not always be high and therefore ap-
pealing across and within selected national contexts, the idea of receiving pay while being 
trained is in itself very attractive (Heine, Spangenberg, & Willich, 2007; Lehmann, Taylor, & 
Wright, 2014; Williams et al., 2013), especially in contexts where apprenticeship completers 
are highly likely to be employable. This is a cornerstone of apprenticeship provision and one 
of the key incentives for individuals. 
5 Incentives for employers to engage with apprenticeship 
Employer engagement is an essential component of apprenticeships; firms’ willingness to 
train apprentices is the conditio sine qua non for an apprenticeship system (Wolter & Ryan, 
2011). Employers, as atomistic entities, may view skills as a private, firm-specific good, or 
may conceive themselves as part of collective entities and see skills as both a private and 
collective good. These two assumptions underpin the analysis that follows. The aforemen-
tioned occupational socialization benefits employers through the opportunity to develop 
employees within the specific work settings where such skills will be deployed, as well as to 
expose new employees to the firm’s work routine. Furthermore, employers potentially benefit 
from apprentices’ contribution towards productivity following their initial training period. 
In Germany, 41% of employers participating in a nationally-representative survey selected ‘to 
employ apprentices as workers even during apprenticeship training’ as a reason for providing 
in-company vocational training (BIBB, 2015). Additionally, in Denmark, there is positive 
employer feedback on the contribution made specifically by adult apprentices who are per-
ceived to be highly motivated trainees (European Commission, 2014). 
The opportunity to undertake preliminary observation of apprentices on the job and to 
expose them to training as a pre-condition for permanent employment can also be conside-
red an incentive for employers (Jansen, Leiser, Wenzelmann, & Wolter, 2015). In Germany, 
83% of employers participating in a nationally-representative survey rated ‘to train young 
workers with a view to employing them long-term in the company as skilled workers’ as a 
reason for providing in-company vocational training (BIBB, 2015). Employers also benefit 
from the fact that following their initial period of training, apprentices contribute to pro-
ductivity. In Germany, an increase of the share of apprentices in a firms’ workforce in trade, 
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commercial, craft or construction occupations is linked with higher labor productivity and 
profitability (Mohrenweiser & Zwick, 2009). The training costs borne by the companies are 
generally low when considering the productivity of the apprentice across the training peri-
od. In England, research suggests that most employers were able to recoup the costs of their 
investment in apprenticeship training within one to two years (Hasluck & Hogarth, 2010). 
The benefits of apprenticeship arrangements are linked to apprenticeship costs and fun-
ding arrangements. The main costs of providing apprenticeship are apprentice wages, trai-
ning in schools and off-the-job settings, and assessment costs. Depending on the country 
context, various cost sharing permutations exists between firms (through direct payment and 
levies), governments and apprentices. In Finland’s publicly funded apprenticeship system, 
the employer receives training compensation to cover the costs of workplace training, where-
by employers taking on an apprentice directly from basic education receive an increased sub-
sidy (OPH, 2016). Incentive payments are also available in Australia for employers who take 
apprentices in occupations that are on the National Skills Needs List (ILO, 2018). The South 
African case, however, demonstrates how some cost sharing arrangements can create dis-
incentives for employers. The assessment of the South African levy shows that ‘[a] problem 
has been the continuation of a “voluntarist” and “short-term” mind-set towards enterprise 
training among employers. Many employers […] view [levy] as little more than an additional 
tax burden impacting negatively on cost structure and profit margins’ (Kraak, 2008). 
Irrespective of the funding arrangement model, firms’ investment in apprentice training 
can support the apprentice-employer relationship, potentially leading to greater motivation 
and company loyalty (Poulsen & Eberhardt, 2016), as apprentices appreciate their employer’s 
willingness to play an active role in their development by investing in training. Firms offering 
apprenticeships can also gain a reputational benefit by honouring the tradition of investing 
in people. In Germany, when probed on the reason for providing in-company vocational 
training, 41% of participating employers in a nationally-representative survey responded: 
‘because apprenticeship is part of tradition’ (BIBB, 2015). In other words, firms are encoura-
ged to participate in apprenticeships in order to adhere to a set of societal expectations and 
values tied to the development of human resources in that society.
Despite all the factors that may incentivize employers to offer apprenticeships, many firms 
view apprenticeship arrangements as too costly, risky and complex to justify the investment. 
One of the main disincentives is that trained apprentices may leave their employer following 
the completion of training when attracted by a competing firm, a phenomenon referred to 
as poaching or free-riding. In this case, the likelihood that firms are unable to justify invest-
ments in apprenticeship training is high. Consequently, save for a few exceptions in stronger 
systems like Germany and Denmark, employers expect the broader education and training 
system - funded by individuals or the taxpayers - to produce appropriately trained talent 
which they can source using competitive pay strategies. 
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In addition, the relatively low status of apprenticeship in some countries also affects the wil-
lingness of employers to partake in this model. In India, where on-the-job training in family 
businesses or informal employment is particularly important in economic areas such as street 
food vending, the need for recognized and certified skills may be less urgent. This is due to 
the high employment levels for those with informally acquired skills, the high cost associated 
with formal training and the prominent role of families in transferring knowledge and skills 
in traditional sectors (Noronha & Endow, 2011; Pilz, Uma, & Venkatram, 2015). As a result, 
the disincentives for apprenticeships in India are reflected by this rather blunt assessment: 
‘Young people do not tend to see apprenticeship as a valued career path, and employers have 
been reluctant to employ apprentices’ (OECD & ILO, 2017). 
Thus, a strong and stable apprenticeship system with a ‘…high degree of standardization 
and consistency’ as exemplified in Germany and Denmark can motivate firms to be involved 
in apprenticeship on a relatively constant basis (Pfeifer, 2016). This contrasts with the ‘frac-
tured’ system in England (Keep, 2015), the ‘relatively dynamic policy-driven development’ 
in Australia (Pfeifer, 2016), Malaysia’s system that is largely propped up by the government 
with the industry only playing a supporting role (Pang, Rajamorganan, & Sim, 2010), and the 
struggle to establish a functioning system in countries such as Egypt, India and South Africa.
5.1 The value of collective efforts
In contrast to the many microeconomic disincentives briefly described above, below we 
present institutional explanations of firms’ incentives. Institutional explanations encompass 
country-specific collective institutions, such as: employer collective organizations (associ-
ations, chambers of commerce/trade), employee organizations (unions, councils), associa-
tions of educational vocational centres/schools/colleges, as well as trainee/learner associa-
tions. Specifically, we focus on employer collective organizations as key social partners. One 
assumption in previously reviewed incentives and disincentives for apprenticeships was that 
skills are a private, firm-specific good. Here, the assumption shifts to consider skills as a broa-
der, collective good instead. 
When firms make decisions collectively, under the umbrella of chambers or associations, 
they are more likely to coordinate their skills investment strategies around mutually-bene-
ficial outcomes linked to skills development as a common good, locally or nationally. From 
the employer’s perspective, Streeck (1989) highlights that ‘if an employer provides training, 
he is no more than adding to a common pool of skilled labour which is in principle accessible 
to all other employers in the industry or the locality, many of which are his competitors’ (p. 94). 
Therefore, as a collective, the investment and effort of training apprentices are then viewed as 
a contribution to the ‘pool’ of talent for the broader sector rather than limited to individual 
firms. Employers engaging in apprenticeship provision as part of collectives may be more 
274 Cross-country comparison of engagement in apprenticeship
inclined to provide apprenticeships than individual firms. Such collectively-owned organi-
sations may be more legitimate bodies to design, assess and administer apprenticeships than 
public officials. As a collective, firms may be more receptive to share the information about 
their skill needs and training options amongst themselves rather than with the government 
(Culpepper, 2003; Wolter & Ryan, 2011). This sense of collective ownership may also prompt 
employer associations/chambers to use different mechanisms, such as ‘dialogic capacity’ or 
peer pressure (Wolter & Ryan, 2011) to persuade resistant firms to invest in the development 
of mutually beneficial human resource. 
Collective employer structures usually exist in countries that have had a long history of 
apprenticeship training, such as Germany and Denmark. The non-optional employer body 
- the Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHK) - offers support 
and advice for individuals with questions regarding apprenticeship training. They provide 
mediation for problems, determine the suitability of businesses and trainers, register the trai-
ning contracts, administer examinations and issue certificates (DIHK, 2017). The Emplo-
yers’ Reimbursement Fund (AUB) in Denmark is an example of a collective structure that 
establishes a common fund that spreads out the cost and benefits of apprenticeship training 
amongst its members. All employers in Denmark make contributions to this fund for each 
full-time employee; subsequently employers with apprentices can then claim reimbursement 
when their trainees attend a vocational school.
Halfway through the spectrum, South Africa and Australia present examples of employer 
collective bodies that are not as extensive as those in Germany or Denmark. For example, in 
South Africa, the Tripartite Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) implement 
sector skills plans by starting learnerships, disbursing the training levies contributed by all 
employers, approving workplace skills plans from employers, and overseeing education and 
training in their sectors. SETAs include representatives from trade unions, employers’ asso-
ciations, the government, and professional bodies (Department of Labour, 2014). In Austra-
lia, the Industry Skills Councils are government-recognized and funded bodies representing 
employers in different sectors that participate in developing the skills and productivity of the 
sector's workforce.
By contrast, in Egypt, employers’ involvement through collective organizations is limited, 
except for the MKI dual-system programme where investors’ associations of mostly medium 
and large companies provide the practical training component of the programme. When 
apprentices finish the training, they receive a certificate from the association and a diploma 
from the Ministry of Education (Ministry of Education of Egypt, 2014). Meanwhile, Pang, 
Rajamorganan, and Sim (2010) observed that in the case of Malaysia, employers are not able 
to take on the role of administering apprenticeship contracts and assessments, or even pro-
moting apprenticeships; these functions are mainly driven by the government’s Department 
of Skills Development. Overall, the analysis aligns with Wolter & Ryan's (2011) argument 
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that countries without organically developed institutions for employer coordination and/or 
social partnership may face an uphill task in expanding apprenticeship provision. Collective 
mechanisms as exemplified above may potentially incentivize employers to view apprentice 
training as a sector-wide investment, though such institutional structures are historically de-
termined within each country context, and are extremely difficult to construct from scratch.
6 How can governments enhance some of these incentives?
There is an indication in literature that governments have tried, with various success, int-
roducing incentives for engagement in apprenticeships (Hargreaves, Stanwick, & Skujins, 
2017). Despite the complexity of the nature of such incentives, governments are in a position 
to encourage employers as well as learners to engage with apprenticeship. A number of these 
possible measures are discussed below. 
The attractiveness of apprenticeship among young people can be increased by improving 
schools-based education and training provision, focusing on enhancing VET teacher trai-
ning, informing parents, career professionals and teachers as key influencers for young peop-
le (Loveder, 2017), providing the flexibility for individuals to move from one qualification to 
another within the vocational route as well as into the academic pathway. Governments can 
also tap into the potential of events such as WorldSkills competitions to encourage people 
to pursue this route (Chankseliani, James Relly, & Laczik, 2016; Chankseliani, James Rel-
ly, & Mayhew, 2015). WorldSkills competitions currently feature 77 member organizations 
and countries, including those included in this study. The broad aims of these competitions, 
which have been taking place biannually since 1950, are to promote greater awareness of the 
contribution of skills and high standards of competence towards individual fulfilment and 
also economic success.
Employers may be incentivized to offer apprenticeships when the government provides 
optimal sets of financial and non-financial incentives to balance employer costs and benefits. 
This entails supporting the training of in-company trainers, contributing to apprentice wa-
ges, or offering particular tax incentives. In most EU countries the national government of-
fers support for training programmes aimed at in-company trainers who are responsible for 
delivering the on-the-job elements of apprenticeship, and in some jurisdictions having ap-
propriately trained trainers is a prerequisite before firms are allowed to take on apprentices. 
Simplification of bureaucracy and regulation may also facilitate employers’ engagement with 
apprenticeships, especially when the system is government-led. The introduction of branding 
schemes that recognize and endorse firms as ‘learning enterprises’- exemplified by the Nor-
wegian government through its PR campaign - may also serve as a non-financial incentive. 
Such recognition may indirectly influence firms’ profit, as socially responsible companies are 
more likely to sell their products and services (CEDEFOP, 2016; Kuczera, 2017b). Govern-
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ments can also ‘promote and build the brand confidence of apprenticeships’ (APPG, 2017), 
through effective communication with firms on the benefits and latest policy developments 
associated with apprenticeships. Equally important is government engagement with indi-
viduals to communicate the benefits of participating in apprenticeships, especially to those 
who are currently under-represented in terms of age, gender, ethnicity groups and geogra-
phical areas. Governments are also well positioned to facilitate communication between em-
ployers, VET institutions and individuals, for instance by orchestrating a public information 
exchange ‘marketplace’ involving the use of apps and websites. In such a marketplace, emplo-
yers offering apprentice spots, institutions offering formal training, and individuals seeking 
training can come together to realize the potential of apprenticeships jointly. 
7 Concluding remarks
Apprenticeship is a model of learning that integrates practice and theory, providing cognitive 
and motivational benefits, facilitating the alignment of the content of educational and trai-
ning programmes with the occupational requirements, and resulting in enhanced opportu-
nities for individual employment as well as better skills match across the national economy. 
Despite a growing political interest in apprenticeship globally, it remains a relatively fragile 
mode of vocational education (Chankseliani et al., 2017); this is largely because of its reliance 
on employer engagement and its low attractiveness to individuals in many different parts 
of the world. It was therefore important to explore what potential incentives are present for 
employers and individuals to engage with apprenticeship. This study explained the logic of 
incentives to participate in apprenticeship for both employers and individual learners using 
the data and literature from ten national contexts to show that individuals may be attracted 
to apprenticeships because of the appeal of learning through doing; the opportunities for oc-
cupational socialization; the possibility of progression to employment or to additional edu-
cation; and the lure of learning while earning. Employers’ interest in offering apprenticeships 
are normally linked to their short-term needs of the production processes, technologies, and 
associated skills; longer-term benefits for the company’s staffing strategy; and the opportu-
nity to make a contribution to the wider education and economic systems. When firms co-
ordinate their skills investment strategies as part of their sectoral associations, they are more 
likely to invest in apprenticeships. However, such institutional arrangements are not in place 
in most international contexts and employer engagement remains a key challenge for susta-
ining apprenticeship systems. In many countries, apprenticeship is yet another government 
training scheme without taking account of the capacity and commitment of employers. 
The low attractiveness of apprenticeship, to employers and to individuals, may be linked 
to the unclear purpose of apprenticeship in some countries. Apprenticeship is commonly 
seen as ‘the answer’ to a wide range of policy issues related to unemployment, skills shortages 
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and skills mismatch, social exclusion and economic problems. Hence, there exists a tension 
between wanting apprenticeship to be viewed as a rigorous, high status model of learning and 
also wanting to use it as a mechanism for providing second chance, social inclusion goals for 
young people who have not succeeded on the academic route of the mainstream schooling. 
Focusing on apprenticeship as a worthwhile route in its own right unlocks the true potential 
of enhancing the incentives and making apprenticeship genuinely attractive to learners and 
employers. What is clear from this study is that the development of a strong apprenticeship 
system requires the buy-in of both employers and individual learners, and the importance of 
identifying and implementing incentives effectively cannot be underestimated. Governments 
can play a key role in realizing the potential incentives for both employers and learners, the-
reby yielding benefits for all parties engaged in apprenticeships.
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